内容
The Selection of Litigation against Government Agencies: Evidence from a Civil Law System
主讲人：崔威（Wei Cui）副教授
Associate Professor, Peter A. Allard School of Law, UBC
与谈人：何渊副教授（上海交通大学凯原法学院）
崔威，加拿大英属哥伦比亚大学（UBC）副教授。哈佛大学社会学学士，塔夫茨大学（Tufts University）哲学硕士，纽约大学税法硕士（LL.M.），耶鲁大学法律博士（J.D.）。在去加拿大英属哥伦比亚大学（UBC）任教之前，曾供职于中国政法大学中美法学院，并担任中国政法大学比较财税法研究中心主任。他曾在密歇根法学院、西北大学、哥伦比亚大学、墨尔本大学担任访问教授，并担任联合国（U.N.）预算事务委员会、全国人大、财政部、国家税务总局的专家顾问。2009年至2010年间，他还曾担任中国投资公司的高级税务顾问。崔威副教授在美国税法和中国税法有丰富的实践经验。崔威副教授的主要研究领域：税收法律和政策，法律和发展，法律和经济学，中国法律和政治经济。
Peter A. Allard School of Law介绍：http://www.allard.ubc.ca/research
讲座内容（论文概要）：
We test the selection theory of litigation in a contemporary, civil law setting, using Chinese judicial data that span 25 years regarding lawsuits against government agencies. Civil law systems may be characterized by lower costs of litigation and lower rates of settlement than the U.S. legal system, and therefore whether selection effects exist cannot be assumed. We show that selection effects are indeed manifest in Chinese administrative litigation, and suggest that this may be explained by hidden or intangible litigation costs. We also argue that our simple approach to testing for selection effects are superior to other approaches adopted by previous studies done in the U.S. context, especially if the identification of selection effects is to help improve inferences from decided cases. Finally, we examine patterns of settlement and plaintiff wins in pre-litigation administrative appeals in China, and do not find sufficient evidence for selection effects in this process. This could potentially be explained if most appellees pursuing administrative appeals do not intend to litigate.
时间：2016年5月24日（周二）下午19:30-21:00
地点：上海交大徐汇校区工程馆111室
主办：上海交通大学财税法研究中心
责任编辑：李萌 助理编辑：刘清越 实习编辑：刘泱
